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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal, Halton L. Flowers asserted the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support his conviction for felony malicious injury to property, because it did not establish the
value of the damage to the damaged items and the fair market value of the destroyed items
exceeded $1,000. Rather than present evidence on the measure of the value of damages pursuant
to State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 1997), the State improperly relied upon the alleged
victim’s testimony on the original purchase price of the items. Mr. Flowers also asserted the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence for malicious injury to property
and for burglary.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that a reasonable jury could have concluded
from the evidence presented that the value of the damage exceeded $1,000, and that the district
court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-33.)
This Reply Brief is necessary because the State’s contention, that the original purchase
price of the destroyed items may be used in this case to sustain the jury’s factual finding that the
value of the damage exceeded $1,000, is contrary to Hughes. Under Hughes, original purchase
price may be used to show the economic value of the loss caused only when the State establishes
the fair market value of a destroyed item cannot be established. However, the State here made
no effort to show the fair market value of the destroyed items was not ascertainable, and thus the
State may not now resort to original purchase price. Because the State did not establish the value
of the damage to the damaged items and fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded
$1,000, the jury could not properly find that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the elements of felony malicious injury to property.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Flowers’ Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State fail to present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Flowers’ conviction for
felony malicious injury to property, because it did not establish the value of the damage
to the damaged items and the fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Flowers following his conviction for malicious
injury to property, and a concurrent unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed,
upon him following his conviction for burglary?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence To Support Mr. Flowers’ Conviction For Felony
Malicious Injury To Property, Because It Did Not Establish The Value Of The Damage To The
Damaged Items And The Fair Market Value Of The Destroyed Items Exceeded $1,000

A.

Introduction
Mr. Flowers asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for felony malicious injury to property. The State did not establish the value of the
damage to the damaged items and the fair market value of the destroyed items, at the time of the
incident, exceeded the threshold amount of $1,000. (See generally Appendix A.) Thus, the jury
could not properly find that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
of felony malicious injury to property.

B.

The State Did Not Establish The Value Of The Damage To The Damaged Items And The
Fair Market Value Of The Destroyed Items Exceeded $1,000
Mr. Flowers asserts the State did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged

items and fair market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000.
The State argues, “The evidence presented by the state was more than sufficient to
sustain the factual finding that the value of the damage caused by Mr. Flowers exceeded $1,000.”
(Resp. Br., p.11.) The State cites cases from outside Idaho for the proposition that “a jury can
properly conclude that the value of damage to common, consumer items—or, the market value of
such items—exceeds a specified amount based on testimony regarding the date on which the
items were purchased, the purchase prices, and the condition of the items.” (Resp. Br., pp.1213.) The State contends that, particularly in a case like the instant one, “where the damage is
extensive, varied, and to a large number of ordinary consumer items,” requiring the State to
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“introduce testimony specifically addressed to providing an appraised value for each such
damage item both pre- and post-damage—imposes an unnecessary and excessively burdensome
requirement on the state not reflected in Idaho Code section 18-7001.” (Resp. Br., p.13.)
According to the State, the jury should instead “be able to rely on its common sense and
experience to determine—in light of evidence regarding the nature of the damage he caused, the
purchase prices of the items damaged, the dates on which those items were purchased, and their
condition—that the cumulative value of the damage caused by Mr. Flowers easily exceeded
$1,000 . . . .” (Resp. Br., p.13.)
To the extent the State contends “market value can be established by reference to
[original] purchase price” of destroyed items (see Resp. Br., p.16), the State’s contention is
contrary to State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 1997). As the State recognizes (see Resp.
Br., p.15), the Court of Appeals in Hughes held with respect to destroyed items that, “upon a
showing that fair market value cannot be established, the State may show the economic value of
the loss caused by the defendant through such factors as original purchase price, replacement
cost, the property’s general use and purpose, and salvage value,” Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703. The
Court held, “replacement cost evidence may be used an indicator of value only when the State
has demonstrated that the fair market value of the destroyed item is not reasonably ascertainable
or that the item had no market value . . . .” Id. Under those standards, the Hughes Court held
replacement cost evidence of a destroyed repair shop garage door was not sufficient to show the
property damage exceeded $1,000, where the State “made no effort to prove the market value of
the destroyed door or to show that its value was unascertainable.” Id. at 703-04.
The State argues “the purchase price is particularly probative in light of the nature of the
items damaged.” (Resp. Br., p.17.) However, the Hughes Court held original purchase price is
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another factor the State may use to show economic loss only where the State shows the fair
market value of a destroyed item cannot be established. Id. at 703. Thus, the State’s contention
that it may establish the fair market value of a destroyed item through its original purchase price
is contrary to Hughes. Like replacement cost evidence, original purchase price evidence “may
be used as an indicator of value only when the State has demonstrated that the fair market value
of the destroyed item is not reasonably ascertainable or that the item had no market value.” See
id.

Here, the State made no effort to show the market value of the destroyed items was

unascertainable. (See generally Appendix A.) Thus, the State may not now resort to original
purchase price to establish the fair market value of the bulk of the destroyed items, such as any
of Ms. Snooks’ clothes considered to be destroyed. (See Resp. Br., p.17.)
Furthermore, with the exception of the lotion poured onto the office room floor (see
Tr., p.90, Ls.9-12), Ms. Snooks did not testify as to the fair market value of any of the destroyed
items at the time and place of their destruction. Under Hughes, the State did not establish the fair
market value of the bulk of the destroyed items. See Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703.
Nor did the State establish the fair market value or cost of repair of any of the damaged
items, as required by Hughes. See id. For damaged items, “Either the diminution of the object’s
fair market value or the reasonable cost of repair is a fair means of measuring damage . . . .” Id.
Here, the State’s evidence on the damaged items’ original purchase price, purchase dates,
condition, and nature of the damage did not “establish the fair market value of the property
immediately before and after the damage,” as necessary for the diminution of value measure.
See id. Moreover, the State’s evidence did not establish the cost of repair, which “may not
exceed the market value of the item before the damage.” See id. Similar to Hughes, the
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evidence presented by the State was tantamount to the owner not having an opinion as to the
market value of the vast majority of the items at the time of the damage. See id. at 704 n.1.
As the State notes (see Resp. Br., p.11), “in civil actions, the owner of property is
competent to testify as to its market value without qualifying the owner as an expert witness,”
and the Idaho Court of Appeals has expressed its belief that Idaho Courts “should apply the same
rule in criminal proceedings, as other jurisdictions have,” State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507,
509-10 (Ct. App. 1998); accord Hughes, 130 Idaho at 704 n.1. Indeed, in this case Ms. Snooks
testified as to the fair market value of the destroyed lotion. (See Tr., p.90, Ls.9-12.)
However, the State did not offer Ms. Snooks’ opinion on the market value of the bulk of
the destroyed items, nor did it offer her opinion as to the diminution in fair market value or cost
of repair of the damaged items. (See generally Appendix A.) That stands in stark contrast to
cases where the owner of damaged or destroyed items actually testified as to the items’ market
value at the time of the loss. See Vandenacre, 131 Idaho at 509-10 (holding substantial evidence
supported a finding that the fair market value of a stereo system exceeded the then-$300
threshold for grand theft, where the owner testified the system at the time of the theft had a fair
market value of $850 based on her understanding of the phrase “fair market value,” her
conversations with people who sold similar new and used systems, and her familiarity with the
sale price of such systems); see also Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho
41, 43 (1995) (holding a district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the majority owner
of a business to give her opinion on the market value of the business before its wholesaler
breached their contract, destroying the marketability of the business).
In contrast to the State’s straw man argument, Mr. Flowers’ position is not that appraisals
must be done to measure damages. (See Resp. Br., pp.13, 16.) Rather, Mr. Flowers asserts that
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the proper measure of damages for a damaged item is either the diminution of the object’s fair
market value or the reasonable cost of repair, and the proper measure of damages for a destroyed
item is the fair market value of the item at the time and place of its destruction. See Hughes, 130
Idaho at 703. An appraisal would be one way to show the fair market value of a destroyed item
(see Tr., p.106, Ls.5-7, p.107, Ls.2-4), just as a repair quote would be one way to show the
reasonable cost of repair for a damaged item (see Tr., p.105, Ls.21-22). Or, as discussed above,
the testimony of the item’s owner could be used to establish the value of the item’s damage or its
fair market value. The State’s deficiency here is that the State did not establish the value of the
damage to the damaged items, or the fair market value of the bulk of the destroyed items.
Because the State did not establish the value of the damage to the damaged items and fair
market value of the destroyed items exceeded $1,000, the jury could not properly find that the
State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of felony malicious injury to
property. The State’s contention, that the original purchase price of the destroyed items may be
used in this case to sustain the jury’s factual finding that the value of the damage exceeded
$1,000, is contrary to Hughes. Even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Flowers’ conviction for felony
malicious injury to property. See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012); I.C. § 18-7001.
Mr. Flowers’ judgment of conviction for felony malicious injury to property should be reversed.1

1

The State argues that, if the district court erred in denying Mr. Flowers’ Idaho Criminal Rule 29
motion, the appropriate relief would be to vacate the felony conviction and remand the case for
entry of a conviction for misdemeanor malicious injury to property and resentencing. (See Resp.
Br., pp.17-26.) The State’s point that the proper course upon remand under the circumstances
here would be to instruct the district court to enter a conviction for misdemeanor malicious
injury to property is well-taken. See I.C. § 1-205; State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 264 (Ct. App.
2010). Thus, Mr. Flowers would amend his requested relief to reversal of his judgment of
conviction for felony malicious injury to property, and remand to the district court for the entry
of a judgment of conviction on a reduced charge of misdemeanor malicious injury to property.
8

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence of Five Years,
With One Year Fixed, Upon Mr. Flowers Following His Conviction For Malicious Injury To
Property, And A Concurrent Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Him
Following His Conviction For Burglary
Mr. Flowers asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, upon him following his conviction for malicious
injury to property, and a concurrent unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, upon
him following his conviction for burglary. The district court should have instead followed
Mr. Flowers’ recommendations by imposing a unified sentence of two years, with one year
fixed, for malicious injury to property; imposing a concurrent unified sentence of five years, with
two years fixed, for burglary; and suspending the sentence to place Mr. Flowers on probation.
The State’s argument that Mr. Flowers did not show the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him is unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary. (See Resp.
Br., pp.27-33.) Thus, Mr. Flowers would direct the Court’s attention to pages 16-21 of the
Revised Appellant’s Brief.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Flowers respectfully requests this Court reverse his judgment of conviction for felony
malicious injury to property, and remand the matter to the district court for the entry of a
judgment of conviction on a reduced charge of misdemeanor malicious injury to property.
Mr. Flowers also respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of April, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BPM/eas
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APPENDIX A
List of Damaged and Destroyed Items
Item

Damage

Striped dress
shirt

Bleached (see
Tr., p.55, L.19 –
p.56, L.20)
Bleached (see
Tr., p.55, L.19 –
p.56, L.20)
Bleached (see
Tr., p.55, L.19 –
p.56, L.20)
Kicked in; bolts
replaced by
metal bolts (Tr.,
p.59, Ls.20-25)

Dress pants

St. Patrick’s Day
shirt
Doggy door

Graduation dress

Boots

Wedding dress
(with alterations)

White jacket

Date of
Purchase
2014 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-8)

Original
Purchase Price
$25 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-6)

Fair Market
Value on 1/1/17
N/A

NA (see Tr.,
p.58, Ls.9-11)

$30 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.9-11)

N/A

NA (see Tr.,
p.58, Ls.11-13)

$15 (Tr., p.58,
Ls.11-13)

N/A

N/A (see Tr.,
p.60, Ls.5-22)

N/A

$90 (Tr., p.62,
L.25 – p.63, L.3)

N/A

$150 (Tr., p.63,
Ls.14-21)

N/A

$800 (Tr., p.68,
Ls.16-19, p.71,
Ls.11-24)

N/A

$150 (Tr., p.72,
Ls.10-16)

N/A

“It had just been
put in . . . . I
don’t remember
the exact date
that the
construction
people put it in.”
(Tr., p.135,
Ls.15-23)
2012 or 2013
Three slashes; “it
(see Tr., p.63,
was cut up.” (Tr.,
Ls.4-9)
p.62, Ls.10-14)
Spring 2016 (Tr.,
“[T]wo big
p.63, Ls.22-23)
slashes on the
sides” (Tr., p.63,
Ls.12-13)
2013 (Tr., p.68,
“[C]ut up, all
Ls.20-22)
over”; multiple
slashes in several
areas (Tr., p.68,
Ls.1-7)
Summer 2015
“[S]lashed on the
(Tr., p.72, Ls.10sides of it, on
14)
both sides. And
then there was a
slash in the
back.” (Tr., p.72,
Ls.2-6)
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Item

Damage

Pink dress shirt

“[S]lashes and
cuts all over it”
(Tr., p.72, Ls.2123)
Designer jeans
Cut up (Tr., p.73,
L.24 – p.74, L.3)
Jeans with flower Cut up (see Tr.,
design
p.73, L.5 – p.74,
L.3)
Regular jeans
“[S]lashed up”
(Tr., p.76, Ls.56)
Jean shorts
“[S]liced from
the bottom of the
shorts up to the
butt pockets”
(Tr., p.78, Ls.67)
Black tank top
It “was all cut
up” (Tr., p.79,
Ls.22-23)
Candle warmer
“[C]ompletely
broke in half. . . .
It’s not usable
anywhere.” (Tr.,
p.81, Ls.6-9)
Owl mug
It “had a big V
chip out of it”
(Tr., p.81, Ls.1011)
Owl candle

It “looked like it
had been thrown.
The beak and the
foot were
smushed in on
it.” (Tr., p.81,
Ls.13-14)

Date of
Purchase
2016 (Tr., p.73,
Ls.3-4)

Original
Purchase Price
$55 (Tr., p.72,
L.24 – p.73, L.2)

Fair Market
Value on 1/1/17
N/A

2016 (Tr., p.75,
Ls.5-12)
2012 (Tr., p.75,
L.25 – p.76, L.1)

$50 (Tr., p.75,
Ls.1-3)
$35 to $45 (Tr.,
p.75, Ls.20-24)

N/A

2014 (Tr., p.76,
Ls.14-16)

$20 to $25 (Tr.,
p.76, Ls.10-13)

N/A

2016 (Tr., p.78,
Ls.11-13)

$25 (Tr., p.78,
Ls.16-17)

N/A

2014 (Tr., p.80,
Ls.7-9)

$15 (Tr., p.80,
Ls.2-6)

N/A

A Christmas
present, received
on 12/25/16 (see
Tr., p.80, Ls.2123)
A Christmas
present, received
on 12/25/16 (see
Tr., p.80, Ls.2123)
A Christmas
present, received
on 12/25/16 (see
Tr., p.80, Ls.2123)

$30 (Tr., p.80,
L.25 – p.81, L.1)

N/A

$16 (Tr., p.81,
Ls.1-2)

N/A

$16 or $16.99
(Tr., p.82, Ls.1316)

N/A
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N/A

Item

Damage

Swimsuit
coverup

“It was
completely torn
up.” (Tr., p.83,
Ls.7-10)
“It was slashed
up as well.” (Tr.,
p.83, Ls.15-16)
“After the 3rd the
computer won’t
even turn on
now.” (Tr., p.83,
Ls.20-23)
It “would not
turn on or
charge” (Tr.,
p.86, Ls.5-12)

Camo tank top

HP computer

Samsung tablet

Kitchen table

One slash to the
top of the table
(Tr., p.88, Ls.1021)

Lotion

The lotion had
been squeezed
onto the floor in
her office room,
and poured over
a lunchbox (see
Tr., p.89, L.23 –
p.90, L.6)
“[T]here’s a big
stain” in the
corner; also a
slash in the floor
(Tr., p.91, Ls.56, p.92, Ls.1-2)

Office room
floor

Date of
Purchase
NA (see Tr.,
p.83, Ls.1-10)

Original
Purchase Price
$25 (Tr., p.83,
Ls.4-6)

Fair Market
Value on 1/1/17
N/A

2015 or Summer
2016 (Tr., p.83,
Ls.11-13)
“When Windows
8 had come out.”
(Tr., p.84, Ls.12)

$15 (Tr., p.83,
Ls.13-14)

N/A

$900 (Tr., p.84,
Ls.3-4)

N/A

$500 (Tr., p.86,
L.17 – p.88, L.4)

N/A

$40 for the full
used set of table
and chairs (see
Tr., p.89, Ls.814)
N/A (see Tr.,
p.90, Ls.8-12)

N/A

Ms. Snooks’ exhusband gifted it
to her on
Christmas 2015
(see Tr., p.86,
L.3 – p.87, L.8)
2014 (Tr., p.89,
Ls.15-17)

She started
selling the lotion
in 2016 (see Tr.,
p.90, Ls.13-17)

She bought the
house in May of
2014 (see Tr.,
p.41, Ls.13-14)
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N/A (see Tr.,
p.91, Ls.8-24)

She sold bottles
of the lotion for
$18 each (Tr.,
p.90, Ls.11-12)

N/A

